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The investigation of human volition is a longstanding endeavor from both philosophers
and researchers. Yet because of the major challenges associated with capturing voluntary
movements in an ecologically relevant state in the research environment, it is only in recent
years that human agency has grown as a field of cognitive neuroscience. In particular, the
seminal work of Libet et al. (1983) paved the way for a neuroscientific approach to agency.
Over the past decade, new objective paradigms have been developed to study agency,
drawing upon emerging concepts from cognitive and computational neuroscience. These
include the chronometric approach of Libet’s study which is embedded in the “intentional
binding” paradigm, optimal motor control theory and most recent insights from active
inference theory. Here we review these principal methods and their application to the
study of agency in health and the insights gained from their application to neurological
and psychiatric disorders. We show that the neuropsychological paradigms that are
based upon these new approaches have key advantages over traditional experimental
designs. We propose that these advantages, coupled with advances in neuroimaging,
create a powerful set of tools for understanding human agency and its neurobiological
basis.
Keywords: agency, voluntary action, Libet, objective measures, intentional binding, motor control, active inference,
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INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the topic of human volition has been the play-
ground and battlefield for philosophers and religious thinkers
to debate the existence of “free will”, its role in driving human
behavior, and its incompatibility with determinism. However,
alongside its conceptual importance in the philosophical dis-
course, impairments in volition have also prompted the scientific
investigation of the psychological processes and neurobiology of
the sense of agency.
The sense of agency refers to the conscious experience that
one has volitional or willed control over one’s own actions,
and through these actions one can influence the environment.
Agency is hence one component of the experience of awareness
of actions, which includes, among other qualia, the sense of
ownership over one’s body parts (Synofzik et al., 2008c). Agency
research has attracted investigators and theorists for many years,
but it is only in recent decades that human agency has become
an active field of neuroscientific research (Haggard, 2008). This
is partly due to the major challenges associated with capturing
voluntary movements in an ecologically relevant state while in
a research environment. Based upon this research, several theo-
ries have been developed to explain the origins of the sense of
agency.
One prominent theory emphasizes the importance of pre-
dictive signals to agency (Blakemore et al., 2002). According to
this “comparator” model, the sense of agency arises as a result
of a comparison between predictive signals generated during
motor planning and the actual sensory effect of one’s action. An
action is perceived as self-caused in the case where there is a
match between the predicted and actual sensory effect. A second
account describes the experience of agency as a postdictive or
retrospective insertion to consciousness—that is, an “editing” of
the conscious experience after the action has already occurred
(Wegner and Wheatley, 1999). In this “apparent mental causa-
tion” theory, an action is self-attributed when it follows one’s
intention; has no other plausible causes and is consistent with
the perceived outcome. There can be an integration of these
predictive and postdictive cues (Synofzik et al., 2013), possi-
bly through an optimal “cue integration” process (Moore and
Fletcher, 2012), in which more reliable cues are given a larger
weight for determining if an action is one’s own. These theories
will be discussed in this Review in the context of specific agency
measures.
The development of neurobiological theories for the sense of
agency is largely the result of a recent boost in agency research.
The seminal work of Libet et al. (1983) has substantially con-
tributed to this growth, as it paved the way towards establishing a
neuroscientific approach to studying human agency. Libet’s study
differed from the early investigations of agency that were domi-
nated by the use of explicit reports of intentionality and control by
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participants. For example, such experimental paradigms involve
asking subjects to rate how much they felt in control of a certain
movement, or whether a sensory stimulus was felt to be the result
of their own action (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2003).
As we discuss below, the application of such tasks is problematic,
especially in the clinical population (e.g., Franck et al., 2001).
The indirect and quantitative approach of Libet’s study has thus
inspired the development of novel agency measures.
Over the last decade, new paradigms which draw upon emerg-
ing concepts from cognitive and computational neuroscience
have been developed to investigate awareness and control of
voluntary action without depending on subjective reports. Here
we review the principal methods for examining agency with
objective measures, including: (1) intentional binding which has
its origins in the chronometric approach embedded in Libet’s
study; (2) motor control theory and the comparator model;
and (3) current and potential application of active inference
theory.
We start off with Libet’s experiment as the key step triggering
the development of indirect and quantitative measures for the
neuroscience of agency, but also describe its caveats that have
highlighted the need for objective measures. We then present the
advantages that have made objective measures of agency so effec-
tive and review the three principal methods. Lastly, we show that
when combined with advances in neuroimaging, these methods
provide critical insights into agency in healthy individuals and in
patients.
LIBET’S EXPERIMENT AND QUANTITATIVE MEASURES
OF AGENCY
The study of Libet et al. (1983) was a landmark in the neu-
roscience of agency. The novelty of the experiment lies in the
successful combination of an ingenious behavioral task with a
neuroimaging technique (electroencephalogram) that provides
neural markers of critical neurophysiological events in volitional
actions. Libet’s pioneering experiment epitomizes the chronomet-
ric approach for agency.
To address the intricate questions surrounding voluntary
actions, one can fractionate the process leading up to the execu-
tion of a movement. Voluntary action becomes a set of decision
processes about, for example, what action to perform, when to
perform it, or whether to perform it at all (Brass and Haggard,
2008). Libet’s experiment focused on the component of “when”
in a voluntary action.
A generalized Libet task involves a self-paced movement,
such as a button press, together with the use of a “clock” for
estimating either the time of a movement or the time of being
aware of the intention to move. In the original paradigm, subjects
were asked to flex their right wrist or finger while attending a
clock face made up of a revolving dot on a screen. There were
three conditions in which subjects reported the clock position
in three events: (i) when they felt an “urge to move” (called “W
judgement”); (ii) when they moved (“M judgement”); and (iii)
when they felt an unexpected skin stimulation (“S judgements”).
Using electromyography to measure muscle activity, the judge-
ments were compared against the veridical time of movement
initiation. It was found that subjects perceive the time of their
intention to move to occur about 200 ms prior to movement.
Time of movement was perceived about 85 ms before movement
onset, and time of sensory stimulation about 50 ms prior to
stimulation.
Electrical brain activity was recorded by electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG). The main aim was to compare subject judgement
errors to the time of the readiness potential, the reliable nega-
tive potential measured by EEG before a voluntary movement
(Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965). The conscious intention lagged
the initiation of the readiness potential by about 300–500 ms.
The finding indicates that brain activity in preparation for action
starts before people are aware they want to perform an action, and
therefore conscious awareness is unable to cause the brain activity
for action execution.
Libet’s experiment kindled two main lines of research.
First, many studies went on to investigate the behavioral and
neural mechanisms of agency by examining the underlying
mechanisms of the task, taking advantage of the quantita-
tive nature of its measures. Second, because Libet’s paradigm
measures the perceived times of events surrounding volun-
tary actions, the paradigm has provided indirect and arguably
more objective measures of agency, compared to the self-reports
of agency that have been traditionally used. These indirect
and quantitative measures have been adopted for the study
of patient populations, where reliable self-reports are often
difficult to obtain. The emergence of an indirect approach
for examining agency in Libet’s task was thus an impor-
tant step towards the development of objective measures for
agency.
The first line of research has examined the mechanisms of
agency through Libet’s task. Although it remains debateable what
exactly the W and M judgements reflect (Lau et al., 2006; Banks
and Isham, 2009), neuroimaging studies have exploited the con-
tinuous and quantitative measures in order to link them with
activity of specific brain regions. EEG data showed that the W
judgement is more closely related to the lateralized component
of the readiness potential, suggesting that it is linked to the
time when a motor plan is specified (Haggard and Eimer, 1999).
Functional MRI has been used to examine the roles of attention
to intention and attention to action in the task (Lau et al.,
2004). Relative to attention to the M judgement, attention to the
W judgement is associated with increased activity in the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (PFC) and intra parietal sulcus of the posterior parietal
cortex (PPC; Lau et al., 2004). In contrast, the M judgement
is associated with activity in the cingulate motor cortex in the
mid-posterior aspect of the medial frontal cortex (Lau et al.,
2006).
Striking evidence for an association between the W judg-
ment and neural activity comes from Fried et al. (2011),
using single cell neuron recording in humans. Neurons in
the SMA, pre-SMA and anterior cingulate cortex predicted
the time of W judgements. The authors proposed that an
integration of these signals leads to conscious awareness of
intentionality. Interestingly, an earlier study showed that stimu-
lation of similar areas induces a similar experience of “urge to
move” a specific body part (Fried et al., 1991). Taken together,
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these results reveal some of the complex neural substrate of
agency.
The second line of research following up Libet’s paradigm
has successfully used the task as a quantitative measure to study
changes in awareness of action in clinical population (reviewed
in Rowe and Wolpe, in press). For example, the sense of agency
might be altered in Tourette’s syndrome by the repeated occur-
rence of involuntary movements or vocalizations known as tics,
which are not perceived by patients as self-caused (Singer, 2005).
This has motivated the investigation of agency in tic disorders
and Tourette’s syndrome, demonstrating for example that the M
judgement is unaffected in Tourette’s patients, whereas the W
judgement is shifted positively towards the time of the movement.
This change in W judgement is proportional to disease severity
(Moretto et al., 2011).
The W judgement is also positively shifted towards the time
of movement in patients with psychogenic movement disorders
(PMD; Edwards et al., 2011). PMD is a constellation of move-
ment disorders that result from a psychological or psychiatric
disturbance, in which patients report the experience of motor
symptoms without their control, although there is no organic
neurological cause (Schrag et al., 2013). PMDs manifest a pos-
itive shift in the W judgement compared to controls, and also
show a small shift in the M judgement, perceiving the time
of movement as later than controls. The shift in W judgement
is larger than that in M judgement, such that overall the two
judgements do not differ in PMDs. The authors suggested the
lack of temporal distinction between intention and action could
explain how PMD patients perceive their psychogenic actions as
involuntary, although these actions share similar neurophysio-
logical correlates as healthy voluntary movements (Schrag et al.,
2013).
Clinical studies suggest that Libet’s task can detect and quantify
changes in the sense of agency. However, although Libet’s main
results have been replicated in numerous studies (e.g., Matsuhashi
and Hallett, 2008), studies using the paradigm have also raised
methodological and interpretative limitations, which should be
taken into account (e.g., see review of Roskies, 2010). One major
criticism relates to the large individual differences in the use of the
“clock” and potential biases in the time estimation procedure (Lau
et al., 2006). This drawback hinders the interpretation of results
from patient studies such as those presented above, which may
simply represent different strategies to the task between patients
and controls.
Another criticism surrounds the ambiguity in judging the time
of an “urge to move”. As described above, the great advantage
of Libet’s task was its indirect and somewhat more objective
nature compared to direct judgements of agency, as it looks at
the perceived times of events surrounding a voluntary action.
However, particularly the W judgement requires an introspec-
tion of a conscious experience. Even if this conscious event
of feeling an urge to move is real and discrete, the subjec-
tive account inherent in the Libet task retains the drawbacks
of a direct approach, underscoring the need for fully objective
measures.
In conclusion, Libet’s task has been subjected to the scrutiny
of a multitude of replication studies and has given important
insights by providing quantitative measures related to agency.
However, due to its limitations and dependence on subjective
experience of agency, there is a need for more objective measures
of volitional actions, which we discuss in the next section.
BEYOND THE “URGE TO MOVE”: ADVANTAGES OF
OBJECTIVE MEASURES OF AGENCY
Emerging concepts from cognitive and computational neuro-
science (Figure 1) have led to novel experimental paradigms that
indirectly map onto awareness and control of action through
objective measures. Although the sense of agency is by definition
a subjective conscious experience, it has been demonstrated that
agency arises from the activity and interaction of different sen-
sory and motor brain areas (Fried et al., 1991, 2011; Desmurget
et al., 2009). An indirect approach exploits the integration of the
sensory and motor systems in the central nervous system, and
the effect of this integration in shaping and perceiving behavior
(e.g., Hamilton et al., 2004; reviewed in Schütz-Bosbach and
Prinz, 2007). Therefore, instead of metacognitive judgements of
agency or time of intentions as in Libet’s task, these paradigms use
low-level perceptual changes that are associated with volitional
actions.
There are three principal advantages for such objective mea-
sures, particularly in patient populations. First, the implemen-
tation of quantitative and objective paradigms is not reliant on
subjective reports and introspection, which might be biased
or confounded. For example, there might be critical differ-
ences between the “feeling of agency” and “judgement of
agency” (Synofzik et al., 2008b). A feeling of agency is the
low-level perceptual experience of whether an action is self-
caused, and it is proposed to be dependent on distinct pro-
cesses in sensorimotor control (see next section). In contrast,
judgement of agency is the explicit, high-order interpretation
of being the agent of an action. The interpretation is depen-
dent on the feeling of agency and additional signals, such as
contextual information (Synofzik et al., 2008b). Moreover, the
judgement of agency might indirectly influence the feeling of
agency (Synofzik et al., 2013). Therefore, probing explicit agency
reports through the judgement of agency might in fact intro-
duce confounding factors, while biasing the measures of inter-
est.
Second, in patient groups, metacognitive insights and self-
monitoring can themselves be impaired, as seen in PMDs (de
Lange et al., 2007; Pareés et al., 2012) and schizophrenia (Frith and
Done, 1989). Such impairments are difficult to measure, but may
interfere with direct measures of agency. For example, schizophre-
nia patients over-attribute sensory events to their own actions
(Franck et al., 2001). However, these patients also tend to “jump
into conclusions” based on less evidence, and ignore new evidence
that supports an alternate inference (e.g., see review by Fletcher
and Frith, 2009). The over-attribution of action might thus reflect
abnormalities in decision making rather than in agency, and it
is not straightforward to separate such metacognitive processes
from the processes that are linked to agency.
Third, new objective paradigms can be designed to probe
specific mechanisms within the volitional operation, in conjunc-
tion with the recent mechanistic insights into both normal and
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FIGURE 1 | Summary of the key theoretical concepts and neuroanatomy
in the study of agency. This review describes some of the key emerging
neuroscientific concepts that have facilitated the acquisition of more objective
measures in agency research. (A) The “clock” represents developments
cognitive neuroscience paradigms, particularly the chronometric approach for
volition that is embedded in Libet’s paradigm and in “intentional binding”. (B)
Comparator model of agency within optimal motor control theory (enlarged in
Figure 2). (C) Precision-dependent cue integration, following optimal
Bayesian integration. (D) The recently developed theory of active inference,
implementing Bayesian principles for voluntary action (enlarged in Figure 3).
(E) Combination of structural and functional neuroimaging (inset adapted
from Wolpe et al., 2014), which when considered together with these
behavioral paradigms, provides a powerful tool for linking behavior to its
underlying brain mechanisms. (F) The central brain illustration depicts the
critical brain areas for voluntary action, which are alluded to in this Review.
BG = basal ganglia; CB = Cerebellum; M1 = primary motor cortex; PFC =
prefrontal cortex; PM = Premotor cortex; PPC = posterior parietal cortex;
pSMA = pre-supplementary motor area; SMA = supplementary motor area.
abnormal voluntary control. In patients, this advantage facili-
tates the achievement of two critical aims: (i) improving the
understanding of clinical phenomenology by addressing more
specific questions about the nature of disorders of agency and
by providing candidate biomarkers for treatments; and (ii) using
disorders as a model for testing mechanistic hypotheses regarding
the neural substrates of agency. Meeting the latter aim could not
only help mapping the functional anatomy for agency, but also
test for causality (i.e., whether a brain area is causally involved in
agency) and necessity (whether it is required for agency).
Together, these advantages have made objective measures
appealing for the neuroscience of agency. We next review the main
three advances in cognitive and computational neuroscience that
have facilitated this research approach.
INTENTIONAL BINDING: OBJECTIVE CHRONOMETRY IN THE
STUDY OF AGENCY
The “intentional binding” paradigm evolved from Libet’s task:
subjects use a “Libet clock” to report the time of either an action,
such as pressing a button, or the time of a sensory event, such as a
tone. When the action and the sensory event are coupled together,
subjects tend to perceive their action as occurring later in time and
the consequent sensory event as occurring earlier in time, relative
to when both events occur separately. Importantly, this temporal
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attraction or the binding of an action and its sensory consequence
does not occur for passive or involuntary TMS-induced actions
(Haggard et al., 2002; Engbert et al., 2008), and is interestingly
related to explicit judgement of control in some cases (Ebert and
Wegner, 2010).
Intentional binding can be generalized to actions and sensory
consequences of different modalities (Engbert et al., 2008), but
most studies use an auditory tone. The principal measures include
binding of action (the delay in the perception of action and its
attraction towards the time of tone) and binding of tone (the
earlier perception of tone and its attraction towards the time of
action) (Haggard et al., 2002). One can also examine “composite”
binding, in terms of the sum of action binding and tone binding
(Moore et al., 2010b; Moore and Obhi, 2012), although there are
caveats to this approach (see below).
Intentional binding measures have already proved advanta-
geous in the study of agency (Moore and Obhi, 2012). The
paradigm elegantly overcomes some of the innate limitations
of Libet’s task. As binding is a relative measure, the paradigm
successfully addresses many critical confounds of Libet’s task,
mainly the individual differences in strategy or biases in time
estimation procedure. Crucially, it does not require subjects to
report conscious reflections, as in an urge to move, making it an
objective chronometric measure for the study of agency.
There are, however, unresolved issues and limitations of the
paradigm that should also be carefully considered. Temporal
binding is not limited to one’s own actions, and can also occur
when observing the actions of another agent (Wohlschläger et al.,
2003) or even when observing a predicted action-effect sequence
generated by a machine (Buehner, 2012). These findings suggest
that intentional binding might simply reflect the temporal bind-
ing resulting from learning the causal relations between actions
and their effects, and cast doubts on the specificity of binding
to one’s own actions and sense of agency. Further, intentional
binding is usually observed on a group level, but there is a large
single-subject variability, and many individuals do not show the
effect (e.g., Wolpe et al., 2013). The source of this high variability
remains largely unknown. Lastly, the paradigm can be subjected
to a similar criticism as Libet’s task with regard to the need for
dividing attention between the action and the clock, as well as
the tone event in the binding task. These concerns emphasize
the importance of examining the underlying mechanisms of
binding.
Since it was introduced, the mechanisms of intentional bind-
ing have been extensively investigated. The relative contribution
of predictive and postdictive or retrospective processes to bind-
ing of action has been examined using a modified intentional
binding task. Moore and Haggard (2008) included two operant
conditions: one in which the action triggered a tone in 50% of
the trials; and another in which the action triggered a tone in
75% of the trials. Baseline measures were subtracted from the
operant conditions as in the typical binding task. Binding of
action was stronger for higher tone probability, but still occurred
in trials with lower tone probability when the action was followed
by a tone. These results suggest that binding of action results
from a combination of predictive and postdictive signals (Moore
and Haggard, 2008). Predictive signals for binding of action
could come from an “efference copy” of motor commands (see
next section). In contrast, the postdictive contribution to bind-
ing of action could be mediated through a precision-dependent
integration of predictive signals with the time of action itself and
its sensory effect (Wolpe et al., 2013).
Interestingly, a similar precision-dependent integration of
predictive and postdictive signals has also been suggested to
govern the correct attribution of actions (Moore and Fletcher,
2012), both in terms of the “feeling” and “judgement” of agency
(Synofzik et al., 2013). The argument is that with optimal cue
integration one can make better estimates by combining different
sources of information, for example about the most likely time
or cause of an action. The relative contribution of each source of
information depends on its reliability (i.e., whether it is variable
or noisy). As in binding of action (Wolpe et al., 2013), the
sense of agency itself can be the outcome of a combination of
predictive cues related to motor planning processes and post-
dictive signals, driven from sensory and high-level contextual
agency cues. The cues are integrated as a function of their
reliability and availability in each particular situation (Synofzik
et al., 2013). The combination of such cues is an intriguing link
between the mechanisms of binding of action and the sense of
agency.
In contrast to binding of action, binding of tone might be
more directly associated with sensorimotor prediction (Waszak
et al., 2012; Wolpe et al., 2013). According to this notion, prepara-
tory motor processes normally lead to a pre-activation of the
neural representation of the predicted sensory effect of one’s
action. When the sensory effect occurs, it reaches the perceptual
threshold faster due to the increased excitability of the appro-
priate sensory representation (Waszak et al., 2012), resulting in
a shortening of the perceptual latency (Wolpe et al., 2013). The
magnitude of this effect can be shaped by high-level beliefs about
the cause of the action, which in turn does not influence binding
of action (Desantis et al., 2011). These examples for a mechanistic
discrepancy between action and tone binding suggest that these
measures could be more informative when considered separately,
which is illustrated next as we review studies of intentional
binding.
Wolpe et al. (2014) have used the intentional binding
paradigm in combination with multimodal brain imaging, to
study the mechanisms of agency through the disorders of agency
associated with the corticobasal syndrome (CBS; Wolpe et al.,
2014). CBS is a progressive asymmetric movement disorder often
caused by cortical and subcortical degeneration (Gibb et al.,
1989). CBS is associated with two disorders of volitional actions:
alien limb (the performance of semi-purposeful movements in
the absence of “will”) and apraxia (in this case the impairment
in the performance of complex movements despite the under-
standing of their goal). We used intentional binding to investigate
possible abnormalities in agency in the more severely affected
limb.
In CBS patients, tone binding was normal in both hands
compared to controls. In contrast, there was a specific increase
in binding of action in the more-affected hand. Binding was
normal in the less-affected hand, providing a crucial internal
control condition that rules out general task deficits. Moreover,
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the magnitude of action binding correlated with the severity of
alien limb and apraxia. The substantial increase in action binding
was interpreted through the lens of cue integration theory: a low
reliability (or high uncertainty) in the perception of time of action
could lead to an over-reliance on the sensory effect for the per-
ception of one’s own action. Supporting this interpretation, the
precision of time estimates in baseline conditions correlated with
action binding, as predicted by the cue integration theory (Wolpe
et al., 2013). The authors proposed that the volitional signals that
drive internally generated actions (and suppress actions triggered
by the environment) were imprecise due to gray and white matter
degeneration.
Intentional binding is also abnormal in patients with PMDs
(Kranick et al., 2013). In these patients, however, there was no
difference in binding of action, but a consistent reduction in
the binding of tone. As binding of tone is strongly reliant on
intact predictive processes for agency, the results suggest a specific
prediction abnormality in PMD which has been confirmed by
complementary methods as illustrated in the next sections.
Abnormal binding is found in patients with schizophrenia
in proportions to symptoms of delusions (Voss et al., 2010).
Almost 80% of schizophrenia patients present with delusions or
false beliefs, many of which implicate the sense of agency, such
as delusions of control or passivity phenomena (Andreasen and
Flaum, 1991). Voss et al. (2010) used the modified binding task
from Moore and Haggard (2008) that is described above and
quantified the relative contribution of predictive and postdictive
signals. The predictive component was calculated by subtracting
judgement errors in the “action only” trials (i.e., when actions
were not followed by tones) in the 50% tone probability condi-
tion, from judgement errors in “action only” trials in the 75%
tone probability condition. The retrospective component was
calculated by subtracting judgement errors in the “action only”
trials in the 50% tone probability condition from judgement
errors in the “action and tone” trials (i.e., when actions were
followed by tones) in the 50% tone probability condition. Patients
showed a substantially diminished predictive contribution, but an
increased retrospective contribution for the perception of time
of action in binding of action. Interestingly, the reduction in the
predictive component was related to severity of positive symp-
toms. The authors suggested that the abnormally high association
between actions and effects in schizophrenia results from an over-
reliance on retrospection, due to impaired prediction (Voss et al.,
2010).
A recent development has been the characterization of phar-
macological contributors to agency. For example, the NMDA
antagonist ketamine enhances binding of action (Moore et al.,
2011), while dopamine replacement therapy in Parkinson’s dis-
ease (PD) increases overall intentional binding (Moore et al.,
2010b). These results suggest that dopamine (or its interactions
with NMDA) can modulate the sense of agency. Further devel-
opment of this pharmacological perspective is anticipated in the
next few years, with major implications for treating disorders of
agency.
Despite the potential limitations of the paradigm, intentional
binding can objectively quantify essential aspects of agency in
health and disease. The task can improve the understanding of
agency when considered together with its underlying mechanisms
of postdictive and predictive volitional processes, the importance
of which is further emphasized in the next section.
OPTIMAL MOTOR CONTROL THEORY AND THE
COMPARATOR MODEL OF AGENCY
The indirect investigation of agency and awareness of action has
drawn on concepts from optimal motor control theory. The prin-
ciples underlying this line of research are: (a) awareness of action
arises from specific processes in motor control (the “comparator”
model); and (b) experimental tools that probe motor control
processes are applicable to the awareness of action (Frith et al.,
2000; Blakemore et al., 2002). In this section we expand these
principles, and illustrate how they have been implemented in
clinical populations.
Optimal motor control theory draws on engineering princi-
ples and a general hypothesis of internal models (Figure 2): to
optimize motor control, the central nervous system internally rep-
resents the dynamics of one’s own body and its interaction with
the external world (Wolpert, 1997; Wolpert and Ghahramani,
2000). These models are learned and updated to reliably represent
the relationship between motor commands and their sensory
effects.
An inverse model generates the appropriate motor command
for movement according to a comparison between the current
state of the body and the goal. Optimization balances perfor-
mance accuracy and the motor costs (Todorov and Jordan, 2002;
Scott, 2004), while a forward model uses an “efference copy” of
the motor command (von Holst, 1954) to predict the sensory
effect of an action. The predicted sensory effect is integrated
with the actual sensory feedback by precision-dependent Bayesian
integration (see Figure 1C). The combination of prior knowledge
(predictions of the forward model) with sensory evidence (actual
sensory feedback) generates a “posterior” distribution for the state
estimate (Wolpert et al., 1995), which in turn is used to update the
motor command.
Within these processes, the comparator model suggests that
the sense of agency arises from the comparison between the
predicted and actual sensory feedback (Frith et al., 2000). If
the predicted sensory effect matches the actual sensory effect, a
sensation is perceived as self-caused. However, when there is a
large discrepancy, a sensation is perceived as externally generated,
independent of one’s own volition. In turn, deficits in any of the
processes of the comparator may underlie abnormalities in the
awareness and control of action (Frith et al., 2000; Blakemore
et al., 2002). The comparator model within optimal motor control
theory has thereby provided a useful framework for addressing
questions surrounding the mechanisms that underlie agency in
health and disease (Rowe and Wolpe, in press).
The comparator model, however, cannot explain some aspects
of the experience of agency. For example, not all divergences
from the predicted sensory effect reach awareness, and small
sensory discrepancies or their ensuing motor adjustments do
not necessarily influence the sense of agency (Castiello et al.,
1991; Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998). The model has also been
criticized for not encompassing external contextual cues, such
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic of the “comparator model” within optimal motor
control theory. A prominent theory in motor control proposes the use of
internal models, which represent the dynamics of the body in the
environment. To generate a voluntary movement, the central nervous
system represents a desired state of the body. This is compared with the
estimated current state, and is converted to a motor command through
inverse models by an optimal feedback controller, so as to minimize both the
difference and the motor costs. An efference copy of the motor command is
used by forward models to predict the sensory effect. The predicted sensory
effect is compared and integrated with the actual sensory feedback from the
moving body part to generate an optimal state estimate. According to the
comparator model, the sense of agency arises from the comparison
between the predicted and actual sensory feedback (opaque blue). When
the discrepancy is small, the sensory effect is attributed to one’s own
volition, but when the discrepancy is large, the sensory effect is interpreted
as externally generated.
as the emotional valence of sensory effect or high level beliefs
about an action (Synofzik et al., 2008b, 2013). The impor-
tance of such postdictive indicators of agency is emphasized in
the “apparent mental causation” theory (Wegner and Wheatley,
1999; Wegner, 2003). These cues have been demonstrated to
influence not only the explicit judgement of agency (Wegner,
2003), but also the lower experience of feeling of agency as
measured by intentional binding (Moore et al., 2009; Desantis
et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, there is currently little doubt as for the impor-
tance of action planning signals, particularly sensorimotor pre-
diction, and the processing of sensory feedback for the sense
of agency. The most recent theories of agency have thus argued
for an integration between the sensorimotor signals embedded
in the comparator model and the high-level postdictive cues for
generating a sense of agency (Moore and Fletcher, 2012; Synofzik
et al., 2013).
In what follows, we review the current research looking at
the role of the sensorimotor signals rooted in the comparator
model for impairments of agency. We first consider studies that
have pointed to an abnormal sensorimotor prediction, followed
by studies of abnormal processing of sensory feedback and their
implications for the sense of agency in patients.
SENSORIMOTOR PREDICTION
Intact sensorimotor prediction is typically linked to the funda-
mental difference between the perception of self-generated and
externally triggered sensory stimuli. For example, the inability
to tickle oneself is dependent on accurate spatio-temporal
predictions (Blakemore et al., 1999). Such difference between
the perception of self- and externally triggered sensations is
captured by “sensorimotor attenuation”, i.e., the reduction in
the perceived intensity of the consequences of one’s own actions
relative to externally caused sensations (Shergill et al., 2003). The
attenuation is temporally centered on the time of the action,
and relies on accurate sensorimotor prediction (Bays et al., 2005,
2006).
Two main explanations for attenuation have been put forward.
One suggests that it is directly linked to the efference copy that
is used by an internal model to generate a predicted sensory
intensity. The predicted sensory intensity is in turn removed
from the actual sensory feedback for the perception of the conse-
quences of one’s action (Bays et al., 2006). A more recent account
posits that attenuation results from a predictive activation of the
sensory representations of the prospective sensation. This “pre-
activation” reduces the sensitivity to the actual sensory stimulus
(Roussel et al., 2013). In either case, attenuation has a critical
behavioral role, facilitating the distinction between the effects of
self-generated actions and external sensory events. Normal sense
of agency thus relies on intact prediction and its consequent
sensorimotor attenuation, which may in turn provide a measure
for the integrity of agency.
A robust method to measure sensorimotor attenuation is a
“force matching” task. In the original task of the haptic modality,
varying forces were applied to subjects’ left index finger by a lever
attached to a torque motor. Subjects were asked to reproduce
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the forces by pressing the lever with their right index finger
(Shergill et al., 2003). Typically, the reproduced forces are larger
than the forces that are actually applied by the torque motor.
The degree of overcompensation has been used as a proxy for
sensorimotor attenuation and the integrity of agency.
In PMDs, the extent of overcompensation is reduced com-
pared to controls, such that patients show a more “accurate”
perception of the sensory consequences of their actions, similar to
external sensory events (Pareés et al., in press). These prediction
deficits in PMD may thus lead to the abnormal perception that
their movements are involuntary and not self-caused (Schrag
et al., 2013), as suggested by the results from Libet’s task.
Reduced attenuation is also reported in schizophrenia (Shergill
et al., 2005), and has been linked to delusions of agency. This
association is further supported by the correlation between visual
sensory attenuation and the severity of delusions (Lindner et al.,
2005). Thus, increasing impairments in sensorimotor prediction
in schizophrenia and the inability to “remove” self-caused sensory
information for perception are tightly linked to delusions of
influence and abnormalities in agency.
Sensorimotor prediction was elegantly probed by Lindner et al.
(e.g., Synofzik et al., 2006), drawing on the methodology of
classic motor adaptation paradigm. Subjects performed out-and-
back ballistic pointing movements, and receive visual feedback
through a mirrored computer screen, while the true position of
their hand was not visible. A deviation in the visual feedback was
introduced, and subjects learned to correct for this perturbation.
Two additional components were added to this conventional
motor adaptation task: a perceptual component, wherein subjects
indicate the perceived position of their action outcome; and a
motor test component, wherein subjects point to a target in the
absence of feedback (Synofzik et al., 2006).
Subjects normally learn to correct their movement in the pres-
ence of an initial deviation in the visual feedback. Interestingly,
after learning to correct for the deviation, subjects perceive their
movement as deviant even when no visual feedback is given, and
move accordingly when asked to point to a target, suggesting they
internally update their predictions. Predictions are thus adapt-
able, enabling the correct attribution of new sensory outcomes
to one’s own action (Synofzik et al., 2006). The authors used the
task to test awareness of action in patients with cerebellar lesions
(Synofzik et al., 2008a) and in schizophrenia (Synofzik et al.,
2010).
Cerebellar patients of mixed pathologies showed intact dis-
crimination thresholds for detecting feedback perturbation in
the sensory effect of their movement. Patients also adapted their
movement similarly to controls when visual feedback was given
throughout the movement (Synofzik et al., 2008a). However,
when no online feedback was given, the cerebellar group showed
reduced perceptual adaptation than controls. Patients also com-
pensated less for the experienced deviation when asked to point
to a target. These results suggest that awareness of action in
cerebellar patients could remain intact, but might be affected
when predictions require adjustments, e.g., when the dynamics
with the environment change (Synofzik et al., 2008a).
In contrast, schizophrenia patients demonstrated increased
thresholds for detecting feedback perturbation in movements.
The magnitude of the increase positively correlated with the
severity of delusions of influence (Synofzik et al., 2010). Moreover,
schizophrenia increased adaptation to the deviated feedback when
it was displayed, but when no feedback was given their updated
perception and adjusted movements were similar to controls
(Synofzik et al., 2010). The results corroborate force matching and
intentional binding data, highlighting an over-reliance on sensory
feedback for the perception of actions in schizophrenia.
PROCESSING OF SENSORY FEEDBACK
According to the comparator model, impaired agency could also
arise from impairments in sensory processing (see Figure 2).
Changes in sensory processing in relation to awareness of action
has been investigated in the context of kinaesthetic deficits in
PD. PD is associated with neuronal dysfunction and loss in the
substantia nigra, which can result in muscular rigidity, resting
tremor, bradykinesia and slowness in the initiation of voluntary
movements (Hughes et al., 1992). PD also affects a wide range of
sensory and cognitive functions, including the perception of one’s
own movement.
Kinaesthesia (the awareness of the position and movement of
one’s body parts) is impaired by PD. For example, patients require
larger passive limb displacements for becoming aware of such
displacement (Konczak et al., 2007). By optimal motor control
theory, kinaesthesia might rely on efferent signals from sensori-
motor prediction, as well as afferent signals from the moving body
part, such as proprioceptive and haptic information. The origins
of kinaesthetic abnormalities was investigated by Konczak et al.
(2012).
An age-related decline in haptic perception was found, with
a strong trend towards an increase in detection thresholds, but
stable discrimination thresholds. In PD, both detection thresholds
and discrimination thresholds were increased (Konczak et al.,
2012). The thresholds were similarly increased both when patients
actively explored a virtual contour surface and when their hand
was passively moved on the surface. As both conditions require
intact processing of sensory feedback, this shared deficit is likely
to arise mainly from impaired low-level processing of afferent sig-
nals. Abnormal afferent signals could thus contribute to abnormal
kinaesthesia and awareness of movement and position of one’s
body limb in PD (Konczak et al., 2012).
To sum up, a growing number of studies employ concepts
from optimal motor control theory in the comparator model
to investigate agency. In addition to their objective nature,
the additional value of these studies lies in their capacity to
reveal specific mechanisms that are required for normal sense of
agency and its changes in patient populations. We next review
an alternative theory to optimal motor control for voluntary
action, and its current and potential applications for the study of
agency.
ACTIVE INFERENCE: A NEW APPROACH TO THE
UNDERSTANDING OF AGENCY
The previous section underscored the importance of sensorimo-
tor prediction for voluntary control and for the sense of agency.
It also emphasized the role of prediction deficits in disorders of
agency, e.g., in PMDs and in schizophrenia. Prediction in the
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brain can also be framed in terms of the “free energy” principle,
according to which the brain constantly seeks to minimize its
“surprise” (Friston, 2010). Surprise in this context amounts to
unexpected sensations or “prediction errors”, including those that
are contingent on one’s own action (Friston, 2010). This principle
can explain several perceptual phenomena and in recent years has
been extended to encompass voluntary actions (Friston, 2011)
and disorders of agency (e.g., Edwards et al., 2012) under a
unifying “active inference” theory.
In order to explain how prediction errors give rise to voluntary
action and agency, it helps to first consider the origins of this
theory in predictive coding for perception. Helmholtz proposed
that perception is a process of probabilistic inference, whereby
the brain infers the sensory causes based on certain sensory
effects (von Helmholtz, 1860). Combined with the free energy
principle, it has been proposed that perceptual inference relies
on hierarchical predictive processing (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013).
Accordingly, higher levels in a cortical hierarchy adjust their
predictions so as to “explain away” sensory samples from the
lower levels (Figure 3A).
Specifically, at each level of the cortical hierarchy there is a set
of neurons encoding predictions, and another set encoding pre-
diction errors (“prediction units” and “prediction error units”).
Prediction units encode the “belief ” at that level, i.e., the prob-
abilistic representation of the causes of sensation, and provide
prediction signals through top-down (backward) projections to
prediction error units at the level below (Feldman and Friston,
2010; Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013). Prediction error units receive
prediction signals from the level above and compare them to
the sensory belief at that level. The discrepancy constitutes the
prediction error, which is projected forward to the higher cortical
level that adjusts its predictions, so as to minimize the prediction
FIGURE 3 | Active inference and the sense of agency. (A) According to
the active inference theory, at each level of the cortical hierarchy, there are
prediction units (blue triangles) representing the “belief” at each level,
which modulate their activity so as to predict the “belief” or inference of the
state at the level below. Backward projection (blue arrows), signal the belief
to prediction error units (red triangles) at the same level and at the level
below. The prediction error units project the error forward (red arrows). This
hierarchical network converges on a minimized prediction error. Minimizing
prediction errors can be achieved by adjusting the sensory information
through movement. High level areas in a motor hierarchy, such as the
pre-SMA (pSMA), signal beliefs or goal states as represented by their
expected sensations to lower level areas, such as the SMA, which in turn
project to the primary motor cortex (M1). Even lower level predictions are
sent to the spinal cord, inducing movements through reflex arcs. The sense
of agency arises from the consistency between predictions in high level and
lower level sensory data, balancing precision across the network. (B) In
psychogenic movement disorders (PMD) for example, there is a
misallocation of attention, and intermediate-level areas gain abnormally high
precision (thick arrows) (Edwards et al., 2012). Consequently, prediction
errors at that level induce movements through lower levels of the hierarchy,
and overwhelm the higher intentional levels that initially did not predict the
movement (dashed arrows). This discrepancy makes the network converge
on the most likely explanation that a movement was externally caused. The
figure is based on Friston et al. (2012).
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error it receives (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Friston, 2010; Clark,
2013). The process of minimizing prediction errors by adjusting
predictions at each level of the hierarchy allows different levels
of representation of the causes of the sensory input—and that is
perception.
Hierarchical predictive processing is implicitly Bayesian in
that the sensory representation or belief at each hierarchical
level is analogous to the Bayesian posterior distribution. It
is derived from a precision-dependent combination of both
prior beliefs (prediction signals) and likelihood or sensory
evidence (prediction error signals) (Friston, 2010). The
precision of the prediction error at each level is important
for determining the balance between prior beliefs and
sensory evidence for perception. The relative precision of
prediction errors is suggested to be determined as a function
of post-synaptic gain, modulated by neuromodulators,
and optimized through attention (Feldman and Friston,
2010).
Predictive coding can be extended to explain voluntary action
in the “active inference” theory (Friston et al., 2010). In the
sensory system, perception is proposed to result from mini-
mization of prediction errors in different levels of the cortical
hierarchy through the adjustment of predictions (or beliefs).
In the motor system, minimizing prediction errors is achieved
by adjusting the sensory data through movement (Figure 3A).
Expectations of the sensory consequence thus drive the movement
of limbs through classical motor reflex arcs, so as to “fulfil”
the prediction signals. In other words, movement is specified
in terms of the expected sensation (Friston et al., 2010). This
theory for voluntary action has been applied to explain move-
ment disorders and abnormalities in the sense of agency in
patients.
PMD has been suggested to result from a misallocation of
attention (Edwards et al., 2012) with abnormally high precision
of prior beliefs at intermediate levels of the cortical hierarchy
(Figure 3B). As a result, the abnormally precise intermediate
priors are spread down the hierarchy to the spinal cord where
they induce abnormal movements through the reflex arcs. In
parallel, the abnormally precise prediction errors are propa-
gated forward to higher “intentional” levels in the hierarchy
(i.e., levels where activity is more directly related to conscious
awareness of action), such as the pre-SMA. As the relative
precision of representations at the higher levels is reduced,
prediction errors at the intermediate levels overwhelm the high-
level intentional priors, and indicate a movement that was
not predicted by the higher levels. The discrepancy between
high intentional levels that do not predict movements and
the abnormally precise intermediate levels leading to move-
ments, causes the abnormal movements to be interpreted as
involuntary, without one’s sense of agency (Edwards et al.,
2012).
In psychosis, abnormal awareness of action has been proposed
to result from a perturbed inference as a result of aberrant
encoding of precision (Adams et al., 2013). Here, abnormal
release of neuromodulators, such as dopamine, together with
altered post-synaptic NMDA receptor densities in PFC, lead
to reduced precision of high-level prior predictions. These
may lead to false perceptual inferences and catatonia. For
example, the suppression of high-level predictions result in their
inability to induce movements, and consequently in akinesia
(Adams et al., 2013). The catatonic state could be rescued
by a compensatory increase in the precision of probabilistic
representations in intermediate levels. In this case, low-level
proprioceptive data does not predominate, allowing top-down
prediction from the intermediate levels to induce movements.
However, the compensatory increase in intermediate precision
now leads to a mismatch between intentional and lower levels
of the hierarchy as in PMD, making the patient prone to a
misattribution of action and abnormal agency (Adams et al.,
2013).
On these active inference accounts, the sense of agency arises
from the capacity of higher intentional levels of the cortical
hierarchy (e.g., pre-SMA, PFC) to predict sensory data from lower
levels (SMA, M1) through movement. Critically, normal agency
depends on a balance in the precision of prediction errors within
the cortical hierarchy for action, and the ability of this balanced
hierarchy to converge on the most likely cause of a sensation. The
theory thus offers a different and novel research avenue for the
objective investigation of agency, focusing on testing parameters
of brain connectivity within hierarchical networks.
A similar approach has been successfully implemented to
investigate the sensory system. For example, the hypothesized
modulation of the precision of prediction errors by the neuro-
modulator acetylcholine has been supported in a multimodal
study (Moran et al., 2013) incorporating the mismatch negativ-
ity paradigm (Näätänen et al., 1978), dynamic causal modeling
(Friston et al., 2003; Rowe et al., 2010a) and a pharmacologi-
cal manipulation. Moreover, it has been shown that individual
differences in connectivity in a hierarchical sensory network can
not only underlie behavioral changes in a perceptual task, but
also relate to delusional ideation of healthy participants (Schmack
et al., 2013).
Although the active inference theory has not yet been applied
experimentally for the study of agency, this approach can already
be implemented in the research lab. Experiments of active infer-
ence on agency could include a behavioral task involving a
voluntary action, such as a simple action selection task (Rowe
et al., 2010b), which triggers activity in the key areas for action
(as in Figure 1F). One could then use dynamic causal model-
ing to reveal variability in connectivity measures within hier-
archical networks for agency, resulting from either individual
differences, pharmacological manipulation or disease state. More-
over, new sensorimotor paradigms that probe different levels
of prediction for voluntary action will be able to shed light
on their underlying neural mechanisms and on the differen-
tial contribution of distinct levels of prediction to the sense of
agency.
Active inference provides an appealing attempt to develop
mechanistic accounts for the sense of agency, among diverse
cognitive and motor phenomena. Importantly, it offers a unified
account by integrating psychophysical and clinical observations
with structural and functional brain imaging. The advantages of
combining neuroimaging with new agency studies are discussed
in the final section.
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AN APERTURE TO AGENCY: COMBINING OBJECTIVE
MEASURES WITH NEUROIMAGING TECHNIQUES TO
UNRAVEL THE MECHANISMS OF AGENCY
As highlighted in the previous section, human brain imaging
enables one to study the widely distributed networks related to
agency. However, early neuroimaging studies of agency focused
on contrasting self vs. externally triggered movements and con-
trasting different levels of perturbations to the sensory feedback.
These univariate analyses implicated several areas, including the
insular cortex, premotor cortex, cerebellum and the SMA and
pre-SMA of the medial frontal cortex (Deiber et al., 1999; Farrer
and Frith, 2002; Wiese et al., 2004; Rowe et al., 2010a, 2008; Rowe
and Siebner, 2012).
As more advanced neuroimaging techniques have evolved,
and in combination with computational modeling methods,
neuroimaging studies have begun to point at more specific mech-
anisms of agency. Multivariate pattern analysis enabled the decod-
ing of intentions from the frontopolar cortex several seconds
before they reached awareness (Soon et al., 2008). Other methods
include the application of accumulation-to-threshold models for
predicting neuronal or BOLD signal in relation to voluntary
actions (Zhang et al., 2012). This approach has shown that based
on an increase in the firing rate of single neurons in the medial
frontal cortex, it is possible to predict the time of awareness of the
urge to move in Libet’s task (Fried et al., 2011). Such data suggest
that the sense of agency emerges when activity of neurons in high-
level areas, such as the pre-SMA reaches a certain threshold.
The advances in neuroimaging methods can be combined with
lesions or clinical disorders. For example, Wolpe et al. (2014)
studied patients with alien limb and apraxia resulting from the
neurodegenerative CBS (Wolpe et al., 2014). They combined
multimodal brain imaging with two of the three main advances
discussed throughout this Review, namely: (i) the quantitative
and objective measure of agency of intentional binding and (ii)
a mechanistic account of agency that draws on optimal motor
control theory. They showed how such a combination leads to a
clear and integrated model of agency and its abnormality.
Patients with CBS showed a specific increase in binding of
action measure of intentional binding in their more-affected
hand, relative to their less-affected hand and to controls. The
extent of the increase correlated with severity of alien limb
and apraxia, suggesting that abnormally enhanced binding of
action reflected the abnormalities in agency in CBS (Wolpe et al.,
2014). Structural neuroimaging of voxel-based morphometry
and diffusion tensor imaging showed that the gray matter
volume in the pre-SMA and the white matter tract integrity
of its connections, were associated with the specific behavioral
change in action binding. Finally, functional connectivity at rest
between the pre-SMA and PFC was increased as a function of
enhanced action binding. Drawing upon the contribution of a
precision-weighted integration to binding of action (Wolpe et al.,
2013), the results suggest that there is reduced precision in the
volitional signals that drive movements in CBS patients. The
reduced precision was associated with impairments in a medial
frontal-prefrontal network for agency and volitional control, with
its hub in the pre-SMA (Wolpe et al., 2014).
Intentional binding was also combined with temporary
“lesions” in healthy adults by transcranial magnetic stimulation.
Stimulation over the pre-SMA, reduced intentional binding of
the outcome tone (Moore et al., 2010a). As binding of the
outcome tone is mainly driven by a reduction of perceptual
latencies through sensorimotor prediction (Waszak et al., 2012;
Wolpe et al., 2013), these results further suggest that the pre-SMA
contributes to the sense of agency through the processing of
specific predictions of the sensory effect.
We propose that the combination of advanced neuroimaging
techniques with recent developments in the study of agency, and
particularly the objective measures of agency, provide a powerful
tool for an integrated study of agency. This approach can be
applied to clinical and pharmacological investigations, thereby
improving treatments for disorders of agency.
CONCLUSIONS
We have reviewed the development and use of objective mea-
sures in the study of agency. We began by showing how Libet’s
experiment was central to the development of the neuroscience
of agency by providing indirect quantitative measures, and by
inspiring the development of objective measures. These indirect
objective measures are based on the chronometric approach in
intentional binding, the comparator model of optimal motor
control and the emerging active inference theory. We have dis-
cussed the advantages of objective measures especially in com-
bination with advanced structural and functional neuroimaging
techniques. We propose that this combination of methods and
their application to patient populations will be important in the
ongoing endeavor to discover the mechanisms of human agency.
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